VEYRNOX · Learn · Coercion Resistance

Coercion Resistance

Coercion resistance is a wallet property that limits the loss a user can be forced to authorise under duress. A coercion-resistant wallet gives the user a plausible fake state to reveal, so a coerced unlock does not expose the real holdings.

How it works

The wallet stores two separately-encrypted vaults keyed by two different PINs. The real PIN derives the KEK for the real vault; the duress PIN derives a different KEK for a decoy vault holding a small, self-funded balance. Unlock, balance display, and outgoing transfers all work under the duress PIN — so an attacker watching cannot tell which vault is active. The real vault is cryptographically inaccessible during the duress session.

Why it matters

Every other wallet control assumes an unforced user. A coercion-resistant design assumes the user may be forced to unlock, and asks: what is the smallest loss the wallet can leak? The answer is the decoy balance, and only that. This shifts the economics of physical crypto theft.

Related concepts

Frequently asked questions

Is coercion resistance the same as plausible deniability?

It is a form of plausible deniability specific to wallets: the attacker cannot prove there is a second vault behind the one they see.

Does coercion resistance require special hardware?

No — it is a software property. Veyrnox uses the Secure Enclave to isolate the two KEKs, but the core defence is cryptographic separation.

Can I test my duress PIN safely?

Yes. Fund the decoy vault with a small amount you can afford to lose, and rehearse the duress unlock so the muscle memory is there when it matters.

In Veyrnox

Veyrnox ships Coercion Resistance on Safety Plus. It is not a hidden partition or a Faraday cage — it is a duress PIN mapped to a decoy vault, engineered so an attacker cannot distinguish the two states from the outside. See the duress wallet page for the threat model.

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